Problem
Long-lived, caller-supplied tokens widen the window for identity abuse: a leaked token remains usable well beyond the task it was needed for.
Current state
Auth verifies a caller-supplied token via an external chain (FORGE_ORG_ID/X-Org-ID -> org_id; forge-cli/runtime/admission_loader.go:30,89, auth chain), with auth_verify/auth_fail audit events. But forge-core does not mint per-task, short-lived tokens; token lifetime is the caller's/IdP's concern. See docs/security/owasp-asi-conformance.md (ASI03 #1).
Proposed control
Integrate task-scoped token minting/exchange (Platform IdM) with a per-invocation TTL; forge-core threads and audits the token scope.
Acceptance criteria
Conformance test
TestASI03_TaskScopedTokenExpires (Platform xfail — token minting is Platform's lane; forge-core side is threading/audit).
Out of scope
Building the IdM/token-exchange service (Platform). Delegation-chain elevation detection (DEP-IAM).
Guideline reference
ASI03 mitigation #1 (OWASP Agentic Top 10 2026).
Problem
Long-lived, caller-supplied tokens widen the window for identity abuse: a leaked token remains usable well beyond the task it was needed for.
Current state
Auth verifies a caller-supplied token via an external chain (
FORGE_ORG_ID/X-Org-ID->org_id;forge-cli/runtime/admission_loader.go:30,89, auth chain), withauth_verify/auth_failaudit events. But forge-core does not mint per-task, short-lived tokens; token lifetime is the caller's/IdP's concern. Seedocs/security/owasp-asi-conformance.md(ASI03 #1).Proposed control
Integrate task-scoped token minting/exchange (Platform IdM) with a per-invocation TTL; forge-core threads and audits the token scope.
Acceptance criteria
Conformance test
TestASI03_TaskScopedTokenExpires(Platform xfail — token minting is Platform's lane; forge-core side is threading/audit).Out of scope
Building the IdM/token-exchange service (Platform). Delegation-chain elevation detection (
DEP-IAM).Guideline reference
ASI03 mitigation #1 (OWASP Agentic Top 10 2026).