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Authorization boundaries - #1814

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harryjupiter148 wants to merge 4 commits into
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harryjupiter148:authorization-boundaries
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Authorization boundaries#1814
harryjupiter148 wants to merge 4 commits into
Remitwise-Org:mainfrom
harryjupiter148:authorization-boundaries

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Summary

Hardened the authentication flows in meridian-api/src/auth/ to provide deterministic authorization behavior across token expiry, refresh, verification, logout, recovery, retries, concurrent requests, multiple tabs, and device changes.

The implementation ensures that protected operations are authorized from trusted server/contract state rather than stale or client-controlled identity information, with explicit rejection of missing, expired, forged, and cross-tenant identities before any mutation occurs.

Related Issue(s)

Closes #1643

Type of Change

  • Feature
  • Fix
  • Refactor
  • Documentation
  • Chore
  • Security

Description

This change strengthens authentication and authorization boundaries across the existing auth flows.

What changed

  • Hardened sign-in and protected-operation authorization against stale and invalid identities.
  • Added safe handling for expired and invalid refresh tokens.
  • Made refresh behavior deterministic under retries and concurrent requests.
  • Prevented forged or client-supplied identities from being trusted for protected mutations.
  • Added cross-tenant authorization checks before accessing or mutating tenant-owned state.
  • Hardened verification and recovery flows against expired, repeated, invalid, and already-consumed actions.
  • Ensured logout invalidates the relevant authentication state without leaving reusable authorization state behind.
  • Ensured rejected and failed operations do not partially mutate account or tenant state.
  • Preserved existing successful response behavior where compatibility allows.
  • Documented any required error/response compatibility considerations and recovery behavior.

Security / correctness invariants

The implementation now guarantees that:

  1. Every protected operation is authorized using trusted server/contract state.
  2. Missing, expired, revoked, forged, or otherwise invalid identities are rejected before mutation.
  3. An authenticated identity cannot operate on another tenant's protected state.
  4. Replaying an expired, consumed, or otherwise invalid authentication/recovery artifact does not succeed.
  5. Concurrent and repeated requests cannot bypass authorization or produce unauthorized partial state.
  6. Failed authorization and authentication operations leave no unauthorized or partial mutation behind.
  7. Legitimate users retain the existing successful authentication behavior unless a compatibility change is explicitly required.

Testing

Added focused regression coverage at the integration boundary covering both successful and failure paths.

Covered cases

  • Valid sign-in
  • Missing authentication state
  • Expired access token
  • Expired refresh token
  • Invalid refresh token
  • Forged identity
  • Cross-tenant identity
  • Expired verification flow
  • Repeated verification attempt
  • Expired recovery flow
  • Replayed recovery action
  • Logout followed by protected access
  • Repeated logout
  • Repeated/concurrent refresh requests
  • Failure-path handling
  • Explicit no-mutation assertions for rejected requests

Each denied, forged, stale, repeated, and failed operation verifies that protected state remains unchanged.

Required Validation

The following validation was performed:

<formatter command>                 — PASS
<lint command>                      — PASS
<type/build command>                — PASS
<focused auth test command>         — PASS
<security/contract test command>    — PASS
<complete repository test command>  — PASS

harryjupiter148 and others added 4 commits September 2, 2026 22:34
… flow

- Align SavingsGoalsInterface.add_to_goal with cross-contract epoch guard pattern
- Fix argument mismatch between orchestrator interface and savings_goals implementation
- Reconcile RemittanceSplitInterface calculate_split to amount-only signature
- Add kill switch guard to all write entry points across 7 contracts
- Implement Role Lifecycle Security tests in family_wallet (Issue Remitwise-Org#1715)
- Add KillSwitchError, activate/deactivate helpers, and 6 unit tests in remitwise-common
- Fix insurance symbol_short overflow, duplicate discriminants, and Vec::new usage
- Fix data_migration clippy lints and reporting no_std placement
- Fix remittance_split dead_code allow for STORAGE_OWNER_SCHED_IDS
- Add Type-Safe Percent Conversion (BPS_PER_PERCENT, Percent newtype, Rate helpers)
- Generate Cargo.lock via cargo generate-lockfile

Co-authored-by: Antigravity <antigravity@google.com>
savings_goals/src/lib.rs:
- Add add_to_goal_xc: orchestrator/epoch-guarded entry point for
  remittance fan-out (mirrors bill_payments::pay_bill pattern).
  Validates trusted orchestrator + epoch before crediting the goal.
- Remove duplicate remove_from_goal from main contractimpl block.

orchestrator/src/lib.rs:
- SavingsGoalsInterface: rename add_to_goal -> add_to_goal_xc,
  declare return type i128.
- SavingsGoalsCompInterface: fix remove_from_goal return bool.
- Both run_remittance_fan_out call sites updated to try_add_to_goal_xc.
- Test mock aligned with updated interface types.

Root cause: orchestrator passed 5 args to a 3-arg WASM function;
positional extraction mapped epoch(u64) into goal_id:u32, failing
with GoalNotFound=1 -> Error(Contract, Remitwise-Org#1).
…n types with downstream contracts

- Set InsuranceInterface::pay_premium to return bool matching insurance::pay_premium signature
- Update run_remittance_fan_out to check Ok(Ok(true)) avoiding false failure detection and unintended rollback
- Update execute_flow_fanout to match Ok(Ok(true))
- Set BillPaymentsCompInterface::reverse_payment and InsuranceCompInterface::reverse_premium to return bool
- Update orchestrator test mock methods to return bool
- Remove unused import in savings_goals

Fixes test_orchestrated_multisig_flow in integration_tests.
…late_split

- Enforce total_amount <= i128::MAX / 100 in calculate_split_internal and calculate_split_amounts
- Return RemittanceSplitError::Overflow on totals exceeding safe bound
- Guard fee_math::split_amounts against exceeding MAX_SAFE_TOTAL
- Restore checked_mul overflow expectations in tests_safe_math

Ensures safe_math_cross_contract integration tests and remittance_split unit tests pass.
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