fix(security): validate GitHub OAuth state nonce to prevent login CSRF - #1307
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RUKAYAT-CODER merged 1 commit intoAug 30, 2026
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Generate the OAuth state value from the CSPRNG instead of Math.random() and validate it in constant time on the callback, so an attacker can no longer predict or reuse the nonce to mount a login CSRF attack. - security: add generateOAuthState/validateOAuthState helpers - github/oauth: generateState now uses the CSPRNG; add validateState - github callback: verify state via validateState before exchanging code - tests for the security helpers, GitHub OAuth utils and callback route Closes rinafcode#1158
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Summary
The GitHub OAuth callback did not validate a cryptographically secure
statenonce, leaving the login flow open to login CSRF. The state value was generated withMath.random()(predictable) and compared with a plain string comparison.This PR makes the nonce unpredictable and checks it in constant time before exchanging the authorization code:
src/middleware/security.ts— addsgenerateOAuthState()(CSPRNG-backed, 256-bit entropy viacrypto.getRandomValues) andvalidateOAuthState()(constant-time comparison).src/lib/github/oauth.ts—generateState()now delegates to the CSPRNG and a newvalidateState(actual, expected)helper is exposed for the callback.src/app/api/auth/github/callback/route.ts— verifies the state parameter against the stored cookie throughvalidateState()and rejects mismatched/missing values before token exchange.Tests
src/middleware/__tests__/security.test.ts— coverage forgenerateOAuthState/validateOAuthState.src/lib/github/__tests__/oauth.test.ts— new test file for the GitHub OAuth utils.src/app/api/auth/github/callback/__tests__/route.test.ts— new route tests covering success, invalid/missing state, OAuth error, missing code, and missing email.All added/updated tests pass;
tsc --noEmitand Prettier checks are clean.Closes #1158