Bump the actions group with 3 updates

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
   check:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
 
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ jobs:
   deny:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
 
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ jobs:
     env:
       TAPLO_VERSION: 0.10.0
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
 
@@ -109,10 +109,10 @@ jobs:
     permissions:
       contents: read
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
 
-      - uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@6599ee8b7a49aef6a770f63d261d214911a7ce02 # v0.6.0
+      - uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@6fc4b006235f201fdab3722e17240ab420d580e5 # v0.6.1
         with:
           advanced-security: false

.github/workflows/claude-review.yml

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ jobs:
       # path is reached.
       id-token: write
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
           persist-credentials: false
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ jobs:
           gh pr comment "$PR" --repo "$REPO" --body '⚠️ **@claude is about to review a PR from an outside contributor.**
           The diff, commit messages, and comments here are **untrusted input** and may contain prompt-injection attempting to make the review agent read or leak CI secrets. The agent is instructed to treat all of it as data, never as instructions — but that is a mitigation, not a guarantee. **Review the diff yourself for injection before relying on the agent'\''s output, and do not merge on the agent'\''s say-so alone.**'
 
-      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@1298632ce7736903d02a1435002705aa2a594a6c # v1.0.175
+      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@44423bdec74b97d67543eb16c110546762c110b2 # v1.0.181
         with:
           anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
           track_progress: true

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
 
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ jobs:
       attestations: write
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
         with:
           persist-credentials: false